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6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
August 17, 1998
Abstract
In cumulative prospect theory models, different behavior concerning gains and losses is per-
mitted. For gains different decision weights are assigned than for losses, and the shape of utility
can reveal loss aversion. Decision analyses concentrate on both, the capacities, which determine
the decision weights, and the nature of utility. This paper focuses on linear/exponential, power
and multilinear utility for decision models under uncertainty. Simple preference axioms are for-
mulated for a representation by a cumulative prospect theory function. All models share the
following axioms: weak ordering, continuity, monotonicity and tail independence. We first show
that in their presence constant absolute (proportional) risk aversion implies linear/exponential
(power) utility. Then, in the multiattribute case, considering (mutual) utility independence, it
is shown that the utility function is (additive/multiplicative) multilinear.
Keywords: cumulative prospect theory, constant absolute (proportional) risk aversion,
multiattribute utility theory.
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1 Introduction
Based on empirical ground cumulative prospect theory (CPT) supports the distinction of
outcomes into gains and losses. The cumulative probabilities are transformed according
to this separation, and the utility function also reflects that distinction. Kahneman &
Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992) proposed a utility function which is
concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. From their
experiments, in which lotteries on monetary outcomes were valued, Tversky & Kahneman
(1992) concluded that a two-sided power function is a good approximate for the utility
function. Different powers for gains than for losses were deduced.
The empirical analysis of Currim and Sarin (1989) confirms the properties of utility
and of the weighting functions in the cumulative prospect theory model. They fitted an
exponential form for utility, and found evidence for different decision weights for gains than
for losses. Smidts (1997) concluded from his data, that a exponential utility fits better
than a power utility. In a different experimental study Beetsma and Schotman (1998)
conclude that the exponential and the power utility perform equally well.
For decision under risk a complete axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory with a
two-part power utility is presented in Wakker & Zank (1997). There, constant proportional
risk aversion of the preference relation determines the nature of utility, in the presence of
the simple axioms: weak ordering, continuity, stochastic dominance and tail independence,
the latter being a weakening of the independence condition of von Neuman & Morgenstern
(1944).
However, as mentioned above, interest in a special form for utility is not limited to
constant proportional risk aversion. Linear/exponential, additive/multiplicative or mul-
tilinear utility families are also topic for many analytic studies (Currim & Sarin, 1989;
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Smidts 1997; Beetsma & Schotman, 1998). Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) derived models
characterizing such families of utilities, assuming the additive representation for a pref-
erence relation on rank-ordered acts given beforehand. They point out that, when there
is interest in a specific form of utility, preference axioms need not immediately imply a
separation of probabilities and utilities in the representing function, but can be weakened
to imply only additive representability. Then, in the presence of constant proportional
(absolute) risk aversion or utility independence, probabilities and utilities can be identi-
fied. This feature will be captured in all our models. First additive representability is
established, and from that a cumulative prospect theory functional is derived.
Other parametric families of utilities, focusing on decreasing or increasing risk aver-
sion, were characterized by Farquhar & Nakamura (1987) and Bell (1988), the so called
“polynomial-exponential” utility functions, a family including the “sumex” utilities pre-
sented in Nakamura (1996). Saha (1993) proposed the “expo-power” utility, a form which
exhibits decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing or increasing pro-
portional risk aversion, depending on the values of the parameters involved. However, such
families will not be discussed here.
This paper deals with decision under uncertainty. For a finite set of states, we first
derive a CPT-model with linear or exponential utility. Here, the central property of the
preference relation is constant absolute risk aversion. This, in addition to weak ordering,
monotonicity, continuity and tail independence, constitutes necessary and sufficient axioms
for the derivation of such a model.
Secondly, we concentrate on a CPT-model with utility as a power function, where
constant proportional risk averse preferences are considered.
Thirdly, for multiattribute outcomes, we focus on preferences satisfying mutual util-
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ity independence or utility independence for attributes, deriving CPT-models with ad-
ditive/multiplicative or multilinear utility, respectively. Also here the additional axioms
are weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity and tail independence, simple axioms, which
imply the existence of additive representing functions on rank-ordered sets.
Proofs are presented in the Appendix, except for Lemma 1.
2 CPT with Linear/Exponential or Power Utility
Throughout this paper S = {1, . . . , n}, with n > 3, is a finite set of states, where exactly
one state is true and there is uncertainty about which is the true state; subsets of S are
events. An act f assigns to each state j ∈ S an outcome f(j), or fj for short. In this
section the set of outcomes is the set of real numbers IR, and thus, we view the set of
acts as the Cartesian product IRn. Positive outcomes are gains and negative outcomes
are losses; they are separated by the zero outcome which is the status quo. Hence, an
act f consists of a gain-part f+ and a loss-part f−, where f+ is the act f with all losses
replaced by the status quo, and f− is the act f with all gains replaced by the status quo.
Sometimes we identify the constant act (x, . . . , x) ∈ IRn with the outcome x ∈ IR.
An act f is rank-ordered if its outcomes are ordered as follows: f1 > · · · > fn. For
each act there exists a permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n} such that fρ(1) > · · · > fρ(n), i.e. the
outcomes are rank-ordered with respect to ρ. For each permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n} the set
IRnρ consists of those acts which are rank-ordered according to ρ. For example, if ρ = id
(i.e. ρ(i) = i for all i), then IRnid is the set of rank-ordered acts.
On the set of acts we assume a preference relation denoted by <. The symbols <,
,∼,4, ≺, are defined in the usual way, i.e. f  g means [f < g and not g < f ], f  g
means [f < g and g < f ], f 4 g means g < f , and f ≺ g means g  f .
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V is a representing function or representation for < if V assigns to each act a real value
such that f < g ⇔ V (f) > V (g). If such a representing function exists then < is a weak
order, i.e. < is complete (f < g or g < f for all acts f, g) and transitive.
One of the best known representations is subjective expected utility (SEU). It holds
whenever the representing function has the following form:
(f1, . . . , fn) 7→ i = 1
n∑
pi · U(fi).
The subjective probabilities pi, for i = 1, . . . , n are uniquely determined; they are non-
negative and their sum equals 1. The utility function U maps from the set of outcomes
into the reals. In this paper we consider only continuous and strictly increasing utility
functions. In the above formula U is cardinal, i.e. unique up to a positive linear transfor-
mation. SEU received much attention for several decades. The first complete axiomatic
characterization of SEU was provided by Savage (1954), and many after him formulated
preference conditions describing SEU (e.g. Anscombe & Aumann, 1963; Wakker, 1984,
1989; d ’Aspremont & Gevers, 1990; Gul, 1992).
Choquet expected utility (CEU) holds if the representing function has the following
form:
(f1, . . . , fn) 7→ i = 1
n∑
πρ,i · U(fρ(i)). (1)
Here, outcomes are first rank-ordered and then they are valued by the representing func-
tion. U is again cardinal. The πρ,j, for j = 1, . . . , n are decision weights defined as follows
πρ,i = ν({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(i)})− ν({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(i− 1)}),
where ν : 2S → [0, 1] is a capacity, i.e. ν(∅) = 0, ν(S) = 1 and ν(A
⋃
B) > ν(A) for all
events A,B. Under CEU the capacity is unique. Consequently, the decision weights are
uniquely determined, they are nonnegative and sum to one for each permutation ρ.
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Capacities are nonadditive extensions of probability measures, thus, whenever ν in (1)
is additive, CEU reduces to SEU above. CEU was introduced by Schmeidler (1989) for
decision under uncertainty (see also Gilboa, 1987; Wakker, 1989; Nakamura, 1990, Chew
& Karni, 1994).
In this paper we focus on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The representing CPT-
function is defined next. Let f be an act such that for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and ρ we
have
fρ(1) > · · · > fρ(k) > 0 > fρ(k+1) > · · · > fρ(n),
where k = 0 means that all outcomes are negative and k = n means that all outcomes are
nonnegative. The CPT-function has the following form
(f1, . . . , fn) 7→ i = 1
k∑
π+ρ,i · U(fρ(i)) (2)
+j = k + 1
n∑
π−ρ,j · U(fρ(j)).
Here the continuous strictly increasing utility function U is required to satisfy U(0) = 0,
and is a ratio scale, i.e. U is unique up to multiplication by a positive real number. For
the decision weights we have different uniquely determined capacities: ν+ for gains and
ν− for losses. They are defined as follows. For i 6 k (the gain-part of f) we have similarly
to CEU
π+ρ,i = ν
+({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(i)})− ν+({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(i− 1)}).
For j > k (the loss-part of f) we have
π−ρ,j = ν
−({ρ(j), . . . , ρ(n)})− ν−({ρ(j + 1), . . . , ρ(n)}).
The CPT-value in (2) can be viewed as the sum of two CEU-values. The first sum is the
CEU-value of the gain-part f+ with respect to the capacity ν+, and the second sum is the
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CEU-value of the loss-part f− with respect to the dual of ν− (recall that here U(0) = 0).
The CEU-form for losses coincides with the original CEU-form, when in the definition of
the decision weights ν−({ρ(j), . . . , ρ(n)}) is replaced by 1− ν−(S\{ρ(1), . . . , ρ(j − 1)}).
Moreover, we can write
CPT (f) = CPT (f+) + CPT (f−),
in agreement with Tversky & Kahneman (1992). Aggregating those two values results in
the final “worth” of the act. This feature is also exhibited in the proofs (see Appendix).
First CPT will be established for gains and then CPT for losses is derived. Then, both
parts merge into the general CPT-function.
In this section first preference axioms are formulated such that the utility function in
(2) becomes an increasing “linear/exponential” function. A function U : IR → IR is from
the increasing linear/exponential family for gains (losses) if one of the following holds for
all x > 0 (x 6 0):
(i) U(x) = α · x, with α > 0,
(ii) U(x) = α · eλx + τ, with α · λ > 0 and τ ∈ IR.
Under CPT utility satisfies U(0) = 0. Therefore, in (i) we dropped the location pa-
rameter, and in (ii) the only possibility for the location parameter is τ = −α. In the
above definition only the form of utility is described. Clearly the parameters α, β, λ can
be different for gains than for losses.
The central property for a preference relation< to identify utility as a linear/exponential
function is constant absolute risk aversion for gains and for losses. For gains (losses) it is
defined as follows
(f1, . . . , fn) < (g1, . . . , gn)⇒ (f1 + ε, . . . , fn + ε) < (g1 + ε, . . . , gn + ε),
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whenever for all i = 1, . . . , n the outcomes fi, fi + ε, gi, gi + ε are gains (losses).
Before formulating the next preference condition some notation is introduced. For an
event I ⊆ S and f, h ∈ IRn by hIf we denote the act which results from f by replacing fi
with hi for each state i ∈ I; for states we write hjf instead of h{j}f . We can now introduce
the independence property for <.
Definition The preference relation < on IRn satisfies tail independence if the fol-
lowing holds:
aIf < aIg ⇔ bIf < bIg,
whenever I = {ρ(1), . . . , ρ(m)} or I = {ρ(l), . . . , ρ(n)} for some m, l ∈ S, and all acts in
question are from the same set IRnρ .
Tail independence requires that the preference between two acts is independent of
common outcomes if, first, the acts are rank-ordered with respect to the same permutation,
and second, if after rank-ordering those acts have their common outcomes placed in the first
m or last (n− l+1) consecutive states. Thus, tail independence not only restricts the sure
thing principle of Savage (1954) to comonotonic acts (called comonotonic independence in
Chew & Wakker, 1996), but in addition it further restricts comonotonic independence to
hold for states in which common outcomes are best or worst. Cumulative prospect theory
satisfies tail independence as is shown in the next lemma. In order to clarify the nature
of CPT the proof is added into the main text.
Lemma 1 CPT implies tail independence.
Proof: Under CPT we have
f < g ⇔ CPT (f+) + CPT (f−) > CPT (g+) + CPT (g−),
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for all acts f, g ∈ IRn.
Let f, g ∈ IRnρ for some permutation ρ of the states. The following is implied by the
above equivalence
i = 1
k∑
π+ρ,i·U(fρ(i))+i = k + 1
n∑
π−ρ,i·U(fρ(i)) > i = 1
k∑
π+ρ,i·U(gρ(i))+i = k + 1
n∑
π−ρ,i·U(gρ(i)).
Assuming now that f, g have common best outcomes, i.e. for some m ∈ S we have
fρ(i) = gρ(i) for all i = 1, . . . ,m, we conclude that the inequality is independent of the
first m summands. Hence, for i ∈ I := {1, . . . ,m}, we can replace fρ(i), gρ(i) by arbitrary
common outcomes hρ(i) without affecting that inequality. Therefore, we can choose hρ(i),
such that hρ(I)f, hρ(I)g ∈ IRnρ , implying
f < g ⇔ hρ(I)f < hρ(I)g.
Because ρ and m are arbitrarily chosen, independence of common best outcomes holds.
Similarly we can show that independence holds for common worst outcomes, which then
implies tail independence of <, and thus completes the proof. 
The preference relation < on IRn satisfies monotonicity if f  g whenever fi > gi for
all states i with a strict inequality for at least one state.
The continuity condition defined here is with respect to the Euclidean topology on IRn:
< satisfies continuity if for any act f the sets {g ∈ IRn|g < f} and {g ∈ IRn|g 4 f} are
closed subsets of IRn.
Theorem 2 Assume n > 3. For a preference relation < on IRn the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a continuous strictly increasing linear/exponential utility and positive
decision weights.
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(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, monotonic-
ity, continuity, tail independence, and constant absolute risk aversion for gains and
for losses.
If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined and the utility function is a
ratio scale. 
Next, we concentrate on the CPT-model with “power” utility. It is the most-used
nonexpected utility form nowadays. For references see Wakker and Zank (1998). They
provided an axiomatization of CPT with power utility for decision under risk. Here an
extension of their results to decision under uncertainty is given.
A function U : IR→ IR is from the positive power family for gains if
U(x) = α+ · xλ+ , withα+, λ+ > 0, forallx > 0,
and it is from the positive power family for losses if
U(x) = −α− · |x|λ− , withα−, λ− > 0, forallx 6 0.
Recall that under CPT we require strict increasingness and U(0) = 0 for the utility
function. Hence, in the above definitions all parameters are positive and no location pa-
rameter is added.
The property of < which determines power utility is constant proportional risk aversion
for gains and for losses. For gains (losses) it is defined as follows
(f1, . . . , fn) < (g1, . . . , gn)⇒ (ε · f1, . . . , ε · fn) < (ε · g1, . . . , ε · gn),
for all ε > 0 whenever all outcomes are gains (losses).
Theorem 3 Assume n > 3. For a preference relation < on IRn the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
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(i) CPT holds, with a positive power utility for gains and for losses, and positive decision
weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, monotonic-
ity, continuity, tail independence, and constant proportional risk aversion for gains
and for losses.
If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined, and the utility function is a
ratio scale. 
3 CPT with Multilinear and Additive/Multiplicative
Utility
Recall that in this paper we consider a finite set of states, S = {1, . . . , n} for a natural
number n > 3, where exactly one state is true and there is uncertainty about which is the
true state. An act f assigns to each state j an outcome fj. In this section we denote the
set of outcomes by X, and X is the product of a finite number of nondegenerate intervals
X1, . . . , Xr, r > 2, called attribute sets. An outcome x ∈ X can be written as a tuple
x = (x1, . . . ,xr) with attribute xt ∈ Xt. Again we can view the set of acts as the product
Xn. Sometimes we identify the constant act (x, . . . , x) ∈ Xn with the outcome x ∈ X.
For simplicity, we assume that each attribute Xt contains the zero value in its interior.
Therefore, X contains the zero outcome, which is the status quo. Actually any other
outcome in X can play the role of the status quo. However, by rescaling the values in each
attribute set we can ensure that the zero outcome becomes the status quo. Moreover, for
money, zero as status quo is widely accepted in empirical work (see Kahneman & Tversky,
1979).
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On the set of acts Xn we assume a preference relation denoted by <. The restriction
of < to the constant acts (and therefore to X) is also denoted by <. Gains and losses are
now defined not only with respect to the status quo, but also depend on the preference
relation < on X. Outcomes x  0 are gains and outcomes x ≺ 0 are losses. Note that
here gains and losses can contain both positive and negative attributes. Therefore, the
“aggregated worth” of an outcome among its r attributes indicates if the outcome is a
gain or a loss or is indifferent to the status quo.
Rank-ordering is also defined with respect to the preference relation < on X: an act
f = (f1, . . . , fn) is rank-ordered if f1 < · · · < fn. Similar to section 2 we denote by Xnρ the
set of acts that are rank-ordered according to ρ, where ρ is a permutation of the states
{1, . . . , n}.
Weak ordering, continuity and tail-independence are defined analogously to section 2.
The preference relation < on Xn satisfies outcome-monotonicity if for all acts f, g ∈ Xn,
fi < gi for all states i implies f < g, with a strict preference if for a state j we have
fj  gj. The preference relation< on Xn satisfies attribute-monotonicity if for all outcomes
x, y ∈ X, [x 6= y and xt > yt for all t = 1, . . . , r] implies x  y.
For a subset T of {1, . . . , r} and outcomes z, x ∈ X we define zTx as the outcome
with attribute zt for t ∈ T and xt for t ∈ T c, where T c := {1, . . . , r}\T . We denote by
XT a factor, which is defined as XT := {Xt|t ∈ T}. Instead of X{t} we use Xt. In this
section the central property is utility independence for factors restricted to rank-ordered
sets, defined next:
Definition Let T ⊆ {1, . . . , r}. The factor XT is utility independent for gains
(losses) if
(xT
c
f1, . . . , x
T cfn) < (x
T cg1, . . . , x
T cgn)
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⇔
(yT
c
f1, . . . , y
T cfn) < (y
T cg1, . . . , y
T cgn),
holds, whenever all acts in question are contained in Xnρ for some ρ, and all outcomes are
gains (losses).
This property determines the following family of utility functions ( Theorem 4). A
function U : X → IR is multilinear if there exist functions Ut : Xt → IR for t = 1, . . . , r
and constants δT ∈ IR for all T ⊆ {1, . . . , r} such that U(x1, . . . ,xr) =
∑
T⊆{1,...,r} δT ·∏
t∈T Ut(x
t).
Utility independence is a central tool in Keeney & Raiffa’s (1976) multiattribute utility
theory. We define the property not only according to the separation into gains and losses
but also restrict it to rank-ordered acts.
Theorem 4 Assume n > 3. For a preference relation < on Xn the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a continuous multilinear utility, strictly increasing in each attribute,
and with positive decision weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, outcome-
monotonicity, attribute-monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and for each
factor Xt, t = 1, . . . , r, utility independence for gains and for losses.
If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined and the utility function is a
ratio scale. 
Mutual utility independence holds for gains (losses) whenever XT is utility independent
for gains (losses) for all T ⊆ {1, . . . , r}. This property characterizes additive/ multiplica-
tive utilities (Theorem 5). A function U : X → IR is additive if U(x1, . . . ,xr) =
∑r
t=1 Ut(x
t)
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and is multiplicative if U(x1, . . . ,xr) =
∏r
t=1 Ut(x
t), where Ut : Xt → IR for all t = 1, . . . , r.
A function is additive/multiplicative if it is either additive or multiplicative.
Theorem 5 Assume n > 3. For a preference relation < on Xn the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a continuous additive/multiplicative utility, strictly increasing in each
attribute, and with positive decision weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, outcome-
monotonicity, attribute-monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and mutual util-
ity independence for gains and for losses.
If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined and the utility function is a
ratio scale. 
4 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: First, statement (i) is assumed, and statement (ii) is concluded: CPT
holds for < on IRn with continuous increasing linear/exponential utility. Weak ordering is
immediate from the existence of the representing CPT-function for <. Monotonicity holds
because utility is increasing and the decision weights are positive. Continuity of utility
implies continuity of <. Tail independence holds by Lemma 1. Finally, constant absolute
risk aversion for gains and losses is implied by the nature of the utility function. This
completes the proof of statement (ii).
Next, I assume statement (ii), and prove statement (i). The proof consists of several
intermediate results. First, it is shown that on the set of rank-ordered acts IRnid the
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preference relation is represented by the additive function described in Lemma 6. Then
(Lemma 7), it is shown that the additive function in Lemma 6, when restricted to rank-
ordered acts with nonnegative outcomes, agrees with the restriction of a CEU-function,
where utility is linear/exponential and the decision weights are positive. Similarly, in
Lemma 8 it is shown that the additive function of Lemma 6, when restricted to rank-
ordered acts with nonpositive outcomes, agrees with a CEU-restriction, where utility is
linear/exponential and the decision weights are positive. In Lemma 7 similar results are
derived for < on IRnρ , for each permutation ρ of the states. Then, it is shown that the
different restrictions fit together into a general function, such that on IRn+ (the set of
acts with nonnegative outcomes) and on IRn− (the set of acts with nonpositive outcomes)
Choquet expected utility holds, and thus on IRn CPT holds for <. We complete the proof
of statement (i) by deriving uniqueness results .
Lemma 6 The preference relation < on IRnid is represented by the additive function
(f1, . . . , fn) 7→
n∑
j=1
Vj(fj),
with continuous strictly increasing functions V1, . . . , Vn : IR → IR, which are uniquely
determined satisfying Vj(0) = 0 for all j and
∑n
j=1 Vj(1) = 1.
Proof: The proof follows immediately from Lemma 7 in Wakker & Zank (1997). There,
the statement is formulated for a preference relation on a set of simple lotteries (i.e. finite
probability distributions over IR) with rank-ordered outcomes. However, they fix a finite
probability distribution, such that only outcomes can vary, which results in a set isomorphic
to IRnid. Then our statement results. 
Lemma 7 On the set of rank-ordered acts with nonnegative outcomes the representation
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of Lemma 6 agrees with the following function
CEU+id : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π+id,j · Uid(fj), (3)
where Uid is a strictly increasing linear/exponential utility function, satisfying Uid(0) = 0
and Uid(1) = 1, and the decision weights π
+
id,j, for j = 1, . . . , n, are all positive. Utility
and the decision weights are uniquely determined.
Proof: We have given the preference relation < on IRnid, which is represented by the
function
∑n
j=1 Vj with the Vj’s as described in Lemma 6. Moreover < satisfies constant
absolute risk aversion on IRn++,id, i.e. the set of rank-ordered acts with positive outcomes.
We define Uid(x) =
∑n
j=1 Vj(x) for all nonnegative x. Therefore, by Lemma 6 Uid
becomes unique satisfying Uid(0) = 0, Uid(1) = 1.
Let us fix some 1 6 i < n. We restrict our analysis to acts with identical outcomes for
the first i states and for the last n − i states, i.e. to acts f with fj = x for j = 1, . . . , i
and fj = y for j = i + 1, . . . , n, for outcomes x, y with x > y > 0. We denote these
acts by (x, y)i. On this two-dimensional subset the preference relation is represented by
(x, y)i 7→ Zi(x) + Wi(y), with Zi :=
∑i
j=1 Vj and Wi :=
∑n
j=i+1 Vj. Constant absolute
risk aversion for gains implies that < on this subset is invariant w.r.t. addition of a
common constant to all outcomes (whenever the resulting acts remain in this subset).
Considering only gains (y > 0), Miyamoto & Wakker (1996, Theorem 1) show that Zi and
Wi are proportional, which obviously remains valid when the zero outcome is included.
Moreover, Zi and Wi are proportional to their sum, which is Uid. Therefore, by Miyamoto
& Wakker, they are of the form Zi = πZi · Uid and Wi = πWi · Uid, for positive uniquely
determined πZi , πWi , which sum to one. Further, Miyamoto & Wakker concluded that the
utility function Uid is from the increasing linear/exponential family for gains. This analysis
holds for any fixed 1 6 i < n.
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We define now π+id,1 := πZ1 , π
+
id,j := πZj − πZj−1 for j = 2, . . . , n− 1, and π
+
id,n := πWn−1 .
Monotonicity implies that all the π+id,j’s are positive. By their definition they are uniquely
determined and sum to one. Then, we can compute V1 = Z1 = π
+
id,1 · Uid, and inductively
Vj = Zj − Zj−1 = π+id,j · Uid for j = 2, . . . , n− 1, and Vn = Wn−1 = π
+
id,n · Uid.
Finally, from this analysis, we conclude that on IRn+,id the representation of Lemma 6
agrees with the function in (3). This concludes the proof of Lemma 7. 
Lemma 8 On the set of rank-ordered acts with nonpositive outcomes the representation of
Lemma 6 agrees with the following function
CEU−id : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π−id,j · Uid(fj), (4)
where Uid is a strictly increasing linear/exponential utility function, satisfying Uid(0) = 0,
and the decision weights π−id,j, for j = 1, . . . , n, are all positive. Utility and the decision
weights are uniquely determined.
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 7. We can view the “problem”
{S, IRn−,id,<,
∑n
j=1 Vj(·)} as an equivalent problem {S∗, IRn+,id,<∗,−
∑1
j=n Vj(−(·))}. Now
S∗ := {n, . . . , 1}, an act (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ IRn−,id corresponds to an act (−fn, . . . ,−f1) ∈ IRn+,id,
and the preference relation <∗ is defined as follows:
(−fn, . . . ,−f1) <∗ (−gn, . . . ,−g1)⇔ (f1, . . . , fn) 4 (g1, . . . , gn).
Therefore <∗ is a continuous monotonic weak order satisfying tail independence and con-
stant absolute risk aversion for gains. Moreover, <∗ is represented by
(−fn, . . . ,−f1) 7→ −
1∑
j=n
Vj(fj),
with the Vj’s as described in Lemma 6. It can now be demonstrated, following the lines
in the proof of Lemma 7, that similar results as in Lemma 7 hold here. Reformulation in
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terms of the problem {S, IRn−,id,<,
∑n
j=1 Vj(·)} gives exactly the statement of Lemma 8.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 9 For each permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n} the preference relation < on IRnρ is rep-
resented by an additive function
(f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
V ρj (fρ(j)),
with continuous strictly increasing functions V ρ1 , . . . , V
ρ
n : IR → IR, which are uniquely
determined satisfying V ρj (0) = 0 for all j and
∑n
j=1 V
ρ
j (1) = 1. The additive function
described above agrees on IRn+,ρ with the following function
CEU+ρ : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π+ρ,j · Uρ(fρ(j)), (5)
and on IRn−,ρ with the function
CEU−ρ : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π−ρ,j · Uρ(fρ(j)) (6)
The utility function Uρ is from the increasing linear/exponential family for both gains
and losses, satisfying Uρ(0) = 0 and Uρ(1) = 1, and the decision weights π
+
ρ,j, π
−
ρ,j, for
j = 1, . . . , n, are all positive. Utility and the decision weights are uniquely determined.
Proof: Take any permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n}. The preference relation < on IRnρ is
a continuous monotonic weak order, satisfying tail independence and constant absolute
risk aversion for gains and for losses. The proofs of Lemma 6, 7 and 8 can be adapted,
considering instead of S the “reordered” set of states Sρ := {ρ−1(1), . . . , ρ−1(n)}. 
We have now obtained representations for < on each set IRnρ , which, on IR
n
+,ρ and IR
n
−,ρ
agree with restrictions of CEU-functions as described in Lemma 9. The next step in the
proof of Theorem 2 is to show that the different functions have identical utility. We show
this only for gains. A similar result can be proved for losses.
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Let ρ be a permutation of the states {1, . . . , n}, such that the set IRn+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,id con-
tains nonconstant acts. Then, CEU+ρ and CEU
+
id jointly represent the preference relation
< on the intersection IRn+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,id. However, any additive representation of < on IR
n
+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,id, because cardinal (see for instance Chateauneuf & Wakker, 1993), becomes unique
by fixing scale and location. Moreover, by reasonings similar to Lemma 9, uniquely de-
termined utility and decision weights can be derived for such a representation. Thus, the
representation for < on IRn+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,id, with unique utility and decision weights, is a re-
striction of both the representation for < on IRn+,ρ and the representation for < on IR
n
+,id.
Consequently, the utilities for both extensions are identical and we conclude that Uρ = Uid
on IR, whenever IRn+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,id contains nonconstant acts.
Now let ρ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n}, such that the set IRn+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,id contains
only constant acts. Then, using the fact that n > 3, one can easily construct a sequence
of permutations ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 of the states such that all sets IR
n
+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,ρ1 , IR
n
+,ρ1
⋂
IRn+,ρ2 ,
IRn+,ρ2
⋂
IRn+,ρ3 , IR
n
+,ρ3
⋂
IRn+,id contain nonconstant acts. Hence, by the analysis before,
we conclude that the utilities for CEU+ρ and CEU
+
id are identical.
Therefore, we conclude that the different functions derived in Lemma 9, have the same
utility function U , and hence assign the same value to constant acts, i.e. the acts which
are commonly contained in all sets IRnρ . Using this result, the following holds:
Lemma 10 For each act f ∈ IRn+ or IRn− there exists a certainty equivalent, i.e. a constant
act xf with f ∼ xf .
Proof (only for the case f ∈ IRn+): Take any act f ∈ IRn+,ρ. Let x be the maximal and
y the minimal outcome of f . Monotonicity of < implies x < f < y. Thus, the following
equivalence holds
CEU+ρ (x) > CEU
+
ρ (f) > CEU
+
ρ (y)⇔ U(x) > CEU+ρ (f) > U(y),
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and, by continuity of U , there exists xf ∈ IR+, with CEU+ρ (f) = U(xf ). By monotonicity,
xf is unique. Hence, the constant act xf is indifferent to f . 
Now we show the existence of a representing CEU-function for < on IRn+. Take any
acts f, g ∈ IRn+. Let be f ∈ IRn+,ρ, g ∈ IRn+,ρ′ and CEU+ρ , CEU+ρ′ the representations for <
on IRn+,ρ, IR
n
+,ρ′ , respectively, derived in Lemma 9. Then, by Lemma 10 we have f < g ⇔
f < xg ⇔ CEU+ρ (f) > CEU+ρ (xg). Further, because utility is the same for all CEU-forms,
it follows that CEU+ρ (xg) = U(xg) = CEU
+
ρ′ (xg) = CEU
+
ρ′ (g). Thus, we conclude
f < g ⇔ CEU+ρ (f) > CEU+ρ′ (g).
By setting f = g, this implies that CEU+ρ agrees with CEU
+
ρ′ on common domain, i.e. on
IRn+,ρ
⋂
IRn+,ρ′ . Thus, they can be considered restrictions of one function. Because f and
g were arbitrary, we conclude the existence of a general function, denoted CEU+, which
represents < on IRn+, and agrees with CEU
+
ρ on IR
n
+,ρ for any permutation ρ of the states.
Recall that the act 1I0 assigns outcome 1 to the states in I and outcome 0 elsewhere.
Now define ν+(I) := CEU+(1I0) for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Obviously, ν+ is a capacity on S.
Moreover the following holds
π+ρ,j = ν
+(ρ(1), . . . , ρ(j))− ν+(ρ(1), . . . , ρ(j − 1)),
for j = 1, . . . , n and any permutations ρ of the states. Because the decision weights are
uniquely determined, by the above definition the capacity ν+ is unique.
Let us summarize: The preference relation < on IRn+ is represented by the function
CEU+ which is a Choquet expected utility function as described in (1). Further the
utility function U is uniquely determined from the increasing linear/exponential family for
gains, satisfying U(0) = 0, U(1) = 1, and the capacity ν+ on S generates positive decision
weights.
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Similarly, for the preference relation < on IRn−, we can derive representability by a
Choquet expected utility function, now denoted CEU−. The utility function U is from
the increasing linear/exponential for losses, it is again unique and satisfies U(0) = 0. The
capacity ν−, now defined by ν−(I) := CEU−(−1I0)/U(−1) for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is again
unique, and it generates positive decision weights. Moreover the following holds for ν−
π−ρ,j = ν
−(ρ(j), . . . , ρ(n))− ν−(ρ(j + 1), . . . , ρ(n)),
for j = 1, . . . , n and any permutations ρ of the states.
Now let f be an act containing both gains and losses. Suppose f ∈ IRnρ for a permu-
tation ρ of {1, . . . , n}. There exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
fρ(1) > · · · > fρ(k) > 0 > fρ(k+1) > · · · > fρ(n).
Then, with f+ the gain part of f , f− the loss part of f , and the V ρj ’s from Lemma 9, the
following holds
j = 1
n∑
V ρj (fρ(j)) = j = 1
n∑
V ρj (f
+
ρ(j)) + j = 1
n∑
V ρj (f
−
ρ(j)),
which, by the results above, is equivalent to
j = 1
n∑
V ρj (fρ(j)) = CEU
+(f+) + CEU−(f−).
Therefore, the additive representations for < on IRnρ described in Lemma 9 can be con-
sidered as restrictions of a common function, defined by f 7→ CEU+(f+) + CEU−(f−).
Obviously, this function represents the preference relation < on the entire set of acts IRn,
and it is a CPT-function as described in (2), with a increasing linear/exponential utility
function for gains and for losses U , which satisfies U(0) = 0 and U(1) = 1. Utility and the
capacities ν+, ν− are uniquely determined by the analysis made separately for gains and
for losses.
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Note that in the derivation of the representation above we have always fixed scale
and location. Let now U∗, µ+, µ− describe a CPT-function representing < on IRn, with
U∗(0) = 0. Thus, only location is fixed for U∗ but not scale. Then, also U∗/U∗(1), µ+, µ−
describes a CPT-function representing < on IRn. Consequently, by the results before,
U∗/U∗(1) = U , and µ+ = ν+, µ− = ν− follows. Further, if U, ν+, ν− describe a CPT-
representation for < on IRn, then also γ · U, ν+, ν− describe a CPT-representation for <
on IRn for any positive γ. This shows that U is a ratio scale, and that the capacities are
uniquely determined. Moreover all generated decision weights are positive. Thus the proof
of statement (ii) is complete.
Hence, we conclude the proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3: That statement (i) implies (ii) is immediate. The proof of (i) from
(ii) is analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 2. The difference is that for the prefer-
ence relation here constant absolute risk aversion is replaced by constant proportional risk
aversion. In Lemma 6 this is not yet relevant, therefore Lemma 6 holds here. Constant
absolute risk aversion was relevant in Lemma 7. Considering constant proportional risk
aversion instead, Lemma 7 remains valid if we replace “Uid is a strictly increasing lin-
ear/exponential utility function” by “Uid is from the positive power family”. Then in the
proof we have to use Theorem 2 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) instead of their Theorem
1. Other than that, the proof can entirely be adapted with a positive power utility Uid
instead of a linear exponential one.
Similarly, the Lemmas 8 and 9 remain valid with power utility instead of linear/exponential
utility. Moreover, the analysis following the proof of Lemma 9 can entirely be repeated
here, concluding statement (i) in Theorem 3. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4: I assume statement (i), and conclude statement (ii). Suppose
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that CPT holds for < on Xn, with a continuous multilinear utility, strictly increasing
in each attribute, and with positive decision weights. Weak ordering of < is immediate
from the existence of the representing CPT-function for <. Outcome-monotonicity holds
the decision weights are positive. Attribute-monotonicity follows because utility is strictly
increasing in each attribute, and because the decision weights are positive. Continuity of
utility implies continuity of <. Tail independence is given by Lemma 1. Finally, on each
set Xnρ utility independence for each factor Xt, t = 1, . . . , r, for gains and losses is implied
by the nature of the utility function. This completes the proof of statement (ii).
Now I prove that statement (ii) implies statement (i). The proof hereof mainly follows
the lines indicated in the proof of statement (i) from (ii) of Theorem 2. I point out
differences here, and whenever possible I refer to that proof.
The first difference consists in the existence of “extreme acts”. An outcome x ∈ X is
maximal if for no other outcome y ∈ X, we have y  x, and x is minimal if for no other
outcome y ∈ X, we have y ≺ x. An act assigning to each state a maximal outcome or to
each state a minimal outcome is an extreme act. Wakker (1993) pointed out difficulties
for additive representability on rank-ordered sets, in the presence of extreme acts. They
had to be excluded in order to derive additive representability. Under proportionality
of the functions in the additive representation on the set of nonminimal and nonmaximal
outcomes, as will be derived here, extensions to extreme acts were possible (see Proposition
3.5 in Wakker, 1993).
Lemma 11 The preference relation < on Xnid\{extreme acts} is represented by the additive
function
(f1, . . . , fn) 7→
n∑
j=1
Vj(fj),
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with continuous functions V1, . . . , Vn : X → IR, which preserve the ordering of outcomes,
and are uniquely determined satisfying Vj(0) = 0 for all j and
∑n
j=1 Vj(w) = 1 for some
fixed w  0.
Proof: The proof follows by similar reasonings to those used in the proof of Lemma 7 of
Wakker & Zank (1997). There it is described how tail independence implies, first locally
then globally, the additivity axioms required in Chateauneuf & Wakker (1993). Then by
Corollary C.5 of Chateauneuf & Wakker additive representability follows. 
For z ∈ X and t = 1, . . . , r we define the sets
Xt,+(z) := {xt ∈ Xt|xt > zt}andXt,−(z) := {xt ∈ Xt|xt 6 zt}.
Now take z ∈ int(X), i.e. the interior of X, with z ∼ 0. We restrict our analysis to
rank-ordered acts from Xn+(z)\{extreme acts} where X+(z) := [X1,+(z)]× · · · × [Xr,+(z)].
Note that by attribute monotonicity the outcomes in X+(z) are all gains except for z,
which by its choice is indifferent to the status quo.
Lemma 12 On the set Xn+,id(z)\{extreme acts} the representation of Lemma 11 agrees
with the following function
CEU+id,z : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π+id,j,z · U
z
id(fj), (7)
where U zid is a multilinear utility function, preserving the ordering on X, and increasing in
each attribute. U zid satisfies U
z
id(z) = 0, and the decision weights π
+
id,j,z for j = 1, . . . , n are
all positive. Utility and the decision weights are uniquely determined.
Proof: We have given the preference relation < on Xn+,id(z)\{extreme acts}, which is
represented by the function
∑n
j=1 Vj with the Vj’s as described in Lemma 11. Moreover
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< satisfies attribute monotonicity and for each attribute set Xj,+(z) utility independence
for gains on Xn+,id(z)\{extreme acts}.
We define U zid(x) =
∑n
j=1 Vj(x) for all x ∈ X+(z). Therefore, by Lemma 11, U zid
becomes unique and satisfies U zid(z) = 0.
Now the reasonings are similar to those in the proof of Lemma 7. Instead of x > y > 0
we have x < y < z, instead of Theorem 1 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) we use Theorem
5, and monotonicity is replaced by outcome-monotonicity. Except for these changes the
proof of Lemma 7 can entirely be repeated here.
We conclude that on Xn+,id(z)\{extreme acts} the representation of Lemma 11 agrees
with the function in (7). This concludes the proof of Lemma 12. 
Let now ẑ, z̃ ∈ int(X) with ẑ ∼ z̃ ∼ 0 be any distinct outcomes. (Such outcomes exist
because r > 2, and because on X the preference relation < is a continuous weak order,
satisfying attribute-monotonicity.) Then, the outcome y, defined by yt := max{ẑt, z̃t} for
all t = 1, . . . , r, is contained in int(X), and by attribute monotonicity satisfies y  0.
A similar analysis as in the proof of Lemma 12 can be made here, such that we can
conclude that on Xn+,id(y)\{extreme acts} the additive function in Lemma 11 agrees with
CEU+id,y : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π+id,j,y · U
y
id(fj), (8)
with uniquely determined multilinear utility function Uyid increasing in each attribute, and
positive decision weights π+id,j,y for j = 1, . . . , n.
Now, both Xn+,id(ẑ) and X
n
+,id(z̃) contain X
n
+,id(y), and the latter contains an open
subset where CEU+id,ẑ and CEU
+
id,z̃ both represent the same preference. By the uniqueness
of the function in (8), we conclude that the utilities and the decision weights in CEU+id,ẑ
and CEU+id,z̃ are identical, i.e. U
ẑ
id = U
z̃
id and π
+
id,j,ẑ = π
+
id,j,z̃ for all j = 1, . . . , n. Moreover,
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because ẑ and z̃ were arbitrarily chosen from int(X), we conclude that the function in (7)
is independent of z, and thus we can suppress the index z in (7).
Recall, that we restricted the above analysis to z ∈ int(X) such that z ∼ 0. Doing
so, the outcomes where Uid is not yet defined are boundary outcomes of X. But for these
boundary outcomes, viewed as constant acts, the function
∑n
j=1 Vj is defined (except
for the extreme acts), and thus, we can continuously extend Uid to those outcomes by
Uid :=
∑n
j=1 Vj, preserving multilinearity.
In Lemma 11 we excluded the extreme acts. However, later in the analysis, we con-
cluded that the Vj’s in Lemma 11 are proportional. Then, by Proposition 3.5 of Wakker
(1993), we can extend
∑n
j=1 Vj to the extreme acts which are gains, and thus, Uid to the
entire set X+,id. Finally we conclude the following:
Lemma 13 On the set Xn+,id the preference relation < is represented by the following
function
CEU+id : (f1, . . . , fn) 7→ j = 1
n∑
π+id,j · Uid(fj), (9)
where Uid is a multilinear utility function, preserving the ordering on X, and increasing in
each attribute; Uid satisfies Uid(0) = 0, Uid(w) = 1; the decision weights π
+
id,j are positive
for all j = 1, . . . , n. Utility and the decision weights are uniquely determined. 
Now the rest of the proof of statement (i) follows the line of the proof of statement
(i) in Theorem 2. The reasonings are similar, and therefore, we briefly indicate the next
steps.
First, for each permutation ρ of the states, on the set Xn+,ρ (X
n
−,ρ) we can derive
representability of < by a function CEU+ρ (CEU
−
ρ ) similar to the one in (9) where utility is
fixed 0 at 0 ∈ X and 1 at w ∈ X. Secondly, we can show that the functions CEU+ρ (CEU−ρ )
are restrictions of a general CEU-function CEU+ (CEU−) , with unique multilinear utility
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and unique capacity, representing < on Xn+ (X
n
−). Third, we can derive CPT for < on X
n.
Finally, we can prove the uniqueness results.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 5: That statement (i) implies (ii) is immediate. The proof of (i)
from (ii) is analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 4. The difference is that for the
preference relation utility independence for attribute sets is replaced by mutual utility
independence. In Lemma 11 this is not yet relevant, therefore Lemma 11 holds here.
Utility independence for attribute sets was relevant in Lemma 12. Considering mutual
utility independence instead, Lemma 12 remains valid if we replace “U zid is a multilinear
utility function” by “U zid is additive/multiplicative utility function”. Then in the proof
we have to use Theorem 4 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) instead of their Theorem 5.
Other than that, the proof can entirely be adapted with a additive/multiplicative utility
U zid instead of a multilinear one.
Similarly, Lemma 13 remains valid with additive/multiplicative utility instead of mul-
tilinear utility. Further, the analysis following the proof of Lemma 13 can entirely be
repeated here, concluding statement (i) in Theorem 5. This completes the proof. 
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